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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CURTIS J. BELLER, 
Petitioner/Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee, 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State 
Driver License Division, 
Respondent/Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant. 
Case No. 20060641-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment and order of the Third 
District Court after de novo judicial review, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 and -15 
(West 2004), of the final agency action taken by the Driver License Division following 
an informal adjudication. See Judgment, Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred upon 
this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Curtis Beller was arrested for driving his motorcycle while under the influence of 
alcohol on July 1, 2005, after he failed field sobriety and portable breathalyzer tests. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (West Supp. 2006), his driver's license was 
1 
suspended for ninety days. R. 1. He requested a hearing to challenge the suspension, as 
permitted by section 53-3-223(6), which was held July 28, 2005. R. 63. The hearing 
officer ultimately upheld the suspension of Beller's license. R. 1,63. On judicial review 
in district court by trial de novo, Third District Court Judge Tyrone Medley affirmed the 
license revocation in a Memorandum Decision and Order entered June 7, 2006. 
Addendum A. Beller timely appealed, and Rolfe timely cross-appealed to challenge the 
ruling on reasonable suspicion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Salt Lake City Police Officer Jeff Kendrick is a motorcycle cop with more than ten 
years' experience who rides a Harley Davidson Road King, R. 79 at 3. Just after 
midnight on July 1, 2005, Officer Kendrick was stopped at the side of the street with 
Officer Martinez, whom he was training. Officer Martinez was assisting another officer 
in a northbound traffic stop and arrest at 831 South 300 West in Salt Lake City. R. 79 at 
4. Officer's Kendrick's attention was drawn to two passing motorcyclists, traveling 
together, who accelerated southbound, i.e., on the other side of the street. The sound 
coming from the muffler of one motorcycle was "extremely loud" and, as the motorcycle 
passed by, he saw that it had blue lights illuminating the engine. R. 79 at 4. Asked to 
compare the sound of the noisy motorcycle, driven by appellant Beller, to the sound from 
his own Harley, Officer Kendrick replied: 
Well, the Harley's got a louder tone than say a Honda with a stock 
exhaust, but this particular motorcycle was extremely loud. It was loud 
2 
enough that you could hear, you know, a block away, and that's not typical 
of a regular stock equipped muffler on a Harley Davidson. 
j ^ 79
 at 4. Officer Kendrick did not know for certain the make of Beller's motorcycle, 
though it looked like his own. R. 79 at 13. He did not pursue Beller at this time because 
he was required to stay with his trainee, Officer Martinez, absent egregious 
circumstances. R. 79 at 8. 
Five or ten minutes later, the same two motorcyclists passed by Officer Kendrick 
again, this time going northbound and passing very close to one of the officers' 
motorcycles at the side of the street. R. 79 at 5. Officer Kendrick believed the sound 
from Beller's muffler was excessively loud and in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.28.100,1 which prohibits alteration or replacement of a stock muffler to make the 
motorcycle's sound louder; he wanted to stop Beller because he thought the excessive 
muffler noise violated the law. Id. He made his assessment of the unusual loudness of 
Beller's motorcycle by relying on his own ears and on his experience, including that with 
'Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.100 (R.65) provides: 
Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in 
good working order and in constant operation. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, no person shall modify the exhaust system of a motor vehicle in 
a manner which will amplify or increase or change the character of the 
noise emitted by the motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the 
muffler originally installed on the vehicle. No person shall sell, furnish, 
provide or purchase, nor shall any person attach to any vehicle any device 
which will or is intended to increase or change the character of the sound of 
the original muffling equipment on any motor vehicle. No person shall 
operate a motor vehicle with an exhaust system so modified. 
3 
motorcycles generally, but not on any device that registered the decibel levels of the 
sound coming from Beller's motorcycle. R. 79 at 6-7, 12. He also believed the blue 
lights on Beller's motorcycle engine violated a city ordinance that prohibits adding 
lighted equipment, Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.090. R. 79 at 7. 
This time Officer Kendrick pursued the two motorcyclists, riding up behind and 
between them at the stop sign on 400 West and 700 South. R. 79 at 10-11. He instructed 
Beller's companion to pull over to the right. Id. at 11. At this point, according to Officer 
Kendrick, Beller spoke up: "Hey, you know, we're just going a couple of blocks away. 
I'm with county." Officer Kendrick replied, "Okay, but I want to talk to you about your 
muffler. Why don't you go and wait across the street for me." R. 79 at 11. 
Although Officer Kendrick did not know when he stopped Beller what the factory 
specifications were for the muffler and lights on Beller's particular motorcycle, he did 
know that no manufacturer makes motorcycles with the "super trap style" muffler like 
that on Beller's. R. 79 at 12. He added: 
When I say super trap style, they've actually got the discs that are added to 
the end of the exhaust, and you can change the discs depending on how 
loud you want it or depending on how much performance you want that 
motorcycle to have, so it's adjustable. I'm not aware of any muffler for 
street use that uses that style of muffler. 
The other thing that drew my attention was there were spark plugs 
mounted in the muffler itself with wires that went back into the bag or 
undercarriage of the motorcycle. 
Id. 
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Beller stipulated at trial that Officer Kendrick smelled alcohol when he crossed the 
treet and approached Beller a short time later. Addendum A, R. 64; Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, Addendum B, R. 24-25. He also saw Beliefs glassy, 
bloodshot eyes, and relaxed facial features. Beller admitted to Officer Kendrick that he 
Tiad been drinking alcohol that evening, then performed poorly on all three field sobriety 
tests Officer Kendrick administered (Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, Walk and Turn, and 
One Leg Stand). After Beller failed the portable breath test, he was arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. He took an intoxilyzer test at 1:55 a.m. and the result was 
.097, above the legal limit of .08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2006). Officer Kendrick gave him a DUI summons and 
notice of the Division's intent to suspend his license for ninety days, a consequence 
mandated by section 53-3-223(3). 
Beller requested an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-3-223(6) (West Supp. 2006). He was represented at this hearing by 
counsel. No one was present at the administrative hearing on behalf of the Driver 
License Division ("the Division") or its director, appellee Nanette Rolfe. See Addendum 
C, CD Recording of Administrative Hearing.2 The hearing officer ultimately upheld the 
2The Court can take judicial notice of the record of this administrative proceeding. 
Moore v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 634, 638 n. 17 (Utah 1986) (taking judicial 
notice of administrative rules and regulations as well as published accounts of 
administrative proceedings and actions); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 
Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.) (noting Utah appellate courts may judicially notice 
the record of proceedings below for the first time on appeal if it would support affirming 
the district court decision below), cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988); Riche v. Riche, 
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suspension, rejecting Beller's contention that Officer Kendrick lacked probable cause for 
the traffic stop or the DUI arrest. R. 1, 63. 
Beller then filed a petition for review by trial de novo in the district court, claiming 
the suspension was based on "arbitrary and capricious acts of agents o f the Division and 
asking for reinstatement of his license. R. 2. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14, 15(1 )(a) 
(West 2004); Utah Code Ann § 53-3-224 (West 2004). Based on Beller's motion and the 
stipulation of Rolfe's counsel, an order was entered reinstating Beller's driving privileges 
during the pendency of judicial review. R. 14-15. Other than appellee Rolfe's proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (included here as Addendum B, R. 2 3 -
27), no other motions or pleadings were filed prior to trial on January 9, 2006. 
The arresting officer, the only trial witness, testified about the reasons for the 
traffic stop. See Transcript, R. 79. (As already noted, Beller stipulated to Rolfe's 
proposed factual findings from the stop onward. Addendum B, R. 24-25.) Beller put on 
no evidence, made no motion to suppress, and made no closing argument. Instead, he 
asked to submit a post-trial memorandum, with Rolfe allowed to respond to it, and this 
request was granted. R. 79 at 14-15. 
784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989) ("Courts may take judicial notice of the records and 
prior proceedings in the same case."); see Utah R. Evid. 201(b)-(c) (West 2006). This is 
apparently what the Utah Supreme Court did in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, 922 P.2d 745, 
751-52 & n.l 1 (Utah 1996). Alternatively, the Court can take judicial notice of the 
hearing recording as a public record. See Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ^ 
31 n.8, 84 P.3d 1134; Utah R. Evid. 803(8) (public records hearsay exception). 
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In his post-trial memorandum, captioned "Memorandum in Support of Petition to 
Reinstate Drivers [sic] License/' Beller asserted that his Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated because Officer Kendrick stopped him without reasonable suspicion of an 
offense. R. 32-39. First, he argued Officer Kendrick was mistaken in his belief that the 
blue lights on the side of the engine of Beller's motorcycle violated any law, since only 
light visible from the front of the motorcycle is prohibited. See Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.28.090. R.36-37. Second, he claimed Officer Kendrick could not have reasonably 
suspected that Beller's muffler was modified in contravention of Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 12.28.100 because the officer did not know the make and model of Beller's 
motorcycle or the factory specifications for the original equipment on Beller's 
motorcycle. R. 38. As a consequence, Beller's memorandum concluded, "the subsequent 
detention was constitutionally unreasonable and Petitioner asks that his driver's license be 
reinstated accordingly." R. 39. 
In her responsive memorandum, Rolfe noted that Beller was belatedly attempting 
to suppress evidence of Beller's drunk driving by invoking the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. R. 41. She argued that the relevant statute, Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-
223(6), does not require a determination of the legality of the traffic stop that led to an 
arrest for DUI and that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in the 
civil administrative proceedings to revoke a driver's license. If, on the other hand, the 
legality of the stop is relevant to the license revocation, Rolfe contended, Officer 
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Kendrick had a reasonable suspicion that Beller's extremely loud muffler had been 
modified in violation of city ordinance. R. 42-48.3 
In reply, Beller contended that the Division had waived any argument about the 
irrelevance of the constitutionality of the traffic stop by not raising it at the administrative 
hearing. He also argued, for the first time, that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
is applicable to driver's license revocation proceedings. R. 53-59. No oral argument was 
held on these issues. R. 61. 
The district court entered its memorandum decision and order on June 7, 2006. 
Addendum A, R. 62-69. Judge Medley concluded that Officer Kendrick lacked 
reasonable suspicion that Beller had committed any traffic violation, required by the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but that the exclusionary rule does not apply in 
driver's license hearings.4 Adhering to Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 
1979), Judge Medley also concluded that license revocation proceedings are remedial and 
not quasi-criminal, R. 67-68, a conclusion Beller does not challenge on appeal. 
3Appellee Rolfe did not pursue any argument concerning the blue lights Officer 
Kendrick saw on the motorcycle engine. 
4Beller erroneously suggests that the trial court also based its ruling on the state 
exclusionary rule that safeguards Utah Constitution, article I, § 14 interests. Br. of Aplt. 
at 5, 9, 11, 18. Although Judge Medley mentioned the state constitution in his ruling, 
Addendum A at 6, R. 67, the record clearly shows Beller made no argument in the trial 
court concerning this state constitutional provision or a state exclusionary rule. Instead, 
his arguments related only to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. See Point III, 
infra. 
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Accordingly, the district court affirmed the Division's order revoking Beller's license and 
lifted the stay on its implementation. Addendum A, R. 62-69. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL/ STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 By failing to raise them at the Driver License Division hearing, did appellant 
Beller waive the issues of whether the exclusionary rule applies in driver's license 
proceedings to exclude evidence of Beller's intoxication because Officer Kendrick lacked 
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop? 
This waiver issue is decided in the first instance by the appellate court; thus, there 
is no standard of review. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 
1998); Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996). Preservation of the 
waiver issue in the trial court by appellee Rolfe was not necessary. Brown & Root 
Industrial Serv. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). 
2. Does the waiver doctrine preclude the Division from arguing, as respondent at the 
trial de novo, that the legality of Officer Kendrick's stop of Beller is irrelevant in the 
driver's license revocation context because the federal exclusionary rule is inapplicable 
there? 
Application of the waiver doctrine presents an issue of law reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 1990) 
(petitioner who failed to timely object at driver's license hearing waived right to raise 
issues on judicial review). 
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3. By failing to raise it in the trial court, did Appellant waive the issue of whether a state 
exclusionary rule applies in driver's license proceedings to protect either Fourth 
Amendment or Utah Constitution article I, section 14 interests? 
This waiver issue is decided in the first instance by the appellate court; thus, there 
is no standard of review. 
4. Do Utah statutes, specifically section 41-6a-521 or section 53-3-223, incorporate the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement for traffic stops that culminate in license 
revocation proceedings for driving while impaired? 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness with 
no deference to the trial court's ruling. Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 
1998); Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, % 16, 136 P.3d 1242, 1246. 
5. Should this Court vacate the trial court's unnecessary determination of whether 
Officer Kendrick had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop of Beller? 
This issue presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State ex rel 
A.R., 1999 UT 43, ^  13, 982 P.2d 73, 77: World Peace Movement of America v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1994); State v. Webster, 2001 UT 
App 238, U 30 n.8, 32 P.3d 976, 985. It arises for the first time in the trial court's 
memorandum decision, but Rolfe contended below that the constitutional legality of the 
traffic stop need only be reached if Judge Medley determined that the exclusionary rule 
was applicable. R. 46. 
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6. If the Court reaches the issue of the constitutionality of the traffic stop, did Officer 
Kendrick have reasonable suspicion to believe that the extremely loud muffler on Better's 
motorcycle had been modified in violation of the city ordinance? 
Appellant misstates the applicable standard of review, arguing that the trial court's 
determination of whether there was reasonable suspicion is a factual finding overturned 
on appeal only if clearly erroneous. Br. of Aplt. at 1, 6. A trial court's determination of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, however, is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference by the appellate court to the trial court's application of this 
legal standard to the historical facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^  15, 103 P.3d 699, 
703; see State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 8, 112 P.3d 507, 509. This issue was 
preserved for cross-appeal in Appellee's memorandum. R. 46-48. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 53-3-223, 41-6a-502, and 41-6a-521 is included in 
Addendum D. The text of the relevant ordinance is included in the body of the brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the informal adjudication before the Division, Appellant argued only that the 
arresting officer lacked probable cause. Because this was insufficient to preserve issues 
concerning a lack of reasonable suspicion and the applicability of the exclusionary rule in 
driver's license proceedings, the trial court should not have addressed them on judicial 
review. In contrast, the Division was not required by the waiver doctrine to argue at the 
11 
informal adjudication that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable there, 
even if Appellant had raised the subject 
Before this Court, Appellant argues that a state exclusionary rule rendered 
inadmissible all evidence of his drunken driving obtained after an unconstitutional traffic 
stop. This issue was not preserved for appeal because it was never presented to the trial 
court; instead only the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was invoked. 
The plain language of Utah's statutes governing license suspension for impaired 
driving reveals they do not incorporate a Fourth Amendment probable cause standard 
before an officer may stop a driver or administer sobriety tests. 
The trial court improperly determined the constitutional issue of whether the traffic 
stop was supported by reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment. This 
issue should not have been addressed, given the trial court's determinative, 
nonconstitutional ruling that the exclusionary rule does not apply in driver's license 
proceedings. 
If the exclusionary rule does apply, the Court should reverse the trial court because 
Officer Kendrick articulated sufficient specific, objective facts constituting reasonable 
suspicion for the traffic stop. Because of the extremely loud sounds coming from the 
muffler on Appellant's motorcycle, as well as the aftermarket muffler modifications the 
officer saw on the muffler, the traffic stop to investigate a suspected equipment violation 
satisfied the Fourth Amendment. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SELLER WAIVED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE BARS EVIDENCE OF HIS 
INTOXICATION IF THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE 
TRAFFIC STOP 
Appellant Beller contends the Inal una! crroncuir.K concluded that the 
exclusionary rule does in H I MI r. nlnirr nl his intoxication garnered by police who 
stopped i >ouable suspicion of a traffic violation *V *>\ -. 
I HI did IRA .ai^e ihese matters during the informal r i r u -,re the 
Division's hearing officer. Beller, who petiiiont/d lm jiiihunl icview of the agency's 
decision by trial de novo, fheivbv \v;m ul «mv arguments about reasonable suspicion and 
application ol ihr I'utttlh Amendment exclusionary rule in driver's license hearings. 
It is axiomatic that "issues not raised in proceedings r- -• i it \ e agencies 
are not subject to judicial rex .c - .;. - , umstances. Brown & Root 
Industrial Serw v hhlash u /, ^4/ i\2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997); accord Badger v. 
limokhnt Mini i '</., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (('fall 1998); Pease v. Industrial ( omm n ru 
oi J, 610 vLiaii i^N-h \s the Utah Supreme Court has held lin\ nai\ei doctrine 
vis so basic and necessary to on,. \ul enforce it despite the lack of a 
'" --vlv objection in |,ippdlu "• 'lie district court]." Brown & Root, 947 P.2d at 677- see 
als* * /V/ -nkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589 (applying waiver doctrine in dm or IICCHM. hearing 
• -- without mention of any objection by Division ai (JK; (rial ik imui HI district court), 
in order to preserve an issue foi i\v www \\H\H ul w i e w in the trial court, a party 
aggrieved by the agenc\ \s ai u« »h ill* i FI- informal adjudicative proceeding, like those 
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before the Division, must have raised an issue to the agency adjudicator's "level of 
consciousness." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847; U.S. Express, Inc. v. State Tax Comm '/?, 886 
P.2d 1115, 1119 n.7 (Utah App. 1994); Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589. This preservation 
requirement has been applied against aggrieved parties seeking judicial review of 
driver's license revocations since at least 1990. In Brinkerhoff, this Court held that the 
trial court had erroneously addressed, on petition for de novo review, issues alluded to, 
but not properly raised, by the petitioner driver during informal adjudication before the 
Division. 790 P.2d at 589 & n.3. 
Here, the only argument made by Beller before the administrative hearing officer 
was in the 29-second closing by his counsel at the informal adjudicative hearing: 
With due respect to the officer, I don't think that there was probable 
cause to stop Mr. Beller for any traffic violation, even though he, his 
muffler may be loud that is not necessarily a violation under Salt Lake City 
ordinances. The blue lights are certainly not. He was able to drive his 
vehicle without incident. He was driving within the speed limit. I 
respectfully submit that there's not probable cause to stop him for not 
only any traffic violation but to believe he was driving under the influence. 
Addendum C at 21:57-22:26 (emphasis added). No mention was made of "reasonable 
suspicion" or a lack of it, and no legal authority was offered for either what constitutes 
reasonable suspicion or how it is assessed by the courts. Moreover, there was no motion 
to suppress evidence, no mention of the exclusionary rule or its applicability in this civil 
administrative proceeding, no legal authority tendered for its applicability there, and no 
argument about the effect its application would or should have on the outcome of the 
administrative proceeding. Counsel's argument, quoted above, is simply insufficient to 
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preserve any Fourth Amendment issue about the exclusionary rule or about reasonable 
suspicion for the traffic stop. See, e.g., Barney v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 885 P.2d 809 
(Utah App. 1994) (concluding general objection at administrative hearing to the conduct 
of the proceeding, with no motion made to address alleged specific deficiencies, is 
insufficient to preserve due process claim for judicial review). 
As this Court is well aware, a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment if based on the officer's articulable, reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
that a driver has violated any applicable traffic or equipment regulations. State v. Lopez, 
873 R2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); State v. Yazzie, 2005 UT App 261, % 7, 116 PJd 969, 
971; see State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995) (concluding an 
equipment violation justified an investigative stop). "Reasonable suspicion" is a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped has committed such a 
violation. Yazzie, 2005 UT App. 261, f^ 7. In contrast, probable cause requires more: it 
exists where "'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." 
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)); accord State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ffll 
17-18,137 P.3d 787, 791-92 (probable cause standard is one of reasonable belief). Of 
course, a "reasonable belief would exist if the officer actually observed a traffic offense, 
but an observed offense is not required for a constitutional traffic stop. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
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at 1132. "Stopping a vehicle may also be justified when the officer has 'reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense . . . . " ' Id. (quotation 
omitted); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 26, 78 P.3d 590, 597 ("Traffic stops are 
analogous to Terry stops, which are justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather 
than probable cause."). 
Officer Kendrick never claimed at the administrative hearing that he had probable 
cause to arrest Appellant for violating ordinances governing muffler modification or 
additional lights; instead, he stopped Beller because he suspected such violations based 
on what he heard and saw. See Addendum C. Nonetheless, Beller argued there only that 
the police lacked probable cause to believe either that he had committed a traffic offense 
or that he was driving under the influence. Under well-established law in Utah, even if 
the hearing officer had agreed with Beller that Officer Kendrick lacked probable cause 
for the traffic stop, the stop was nonetheless lawful (and the evidence adduced therefore 
admissible under the Fourth Amendment) if it was supported by reasonable suspicion, 
which Beller never contested at the administrative hearing. 
"[T]he failure to make known the nature of one's rights in the course of an 
administrative proceeding clearly disentitles a party from raising its claim for the first 
time before a district court on de novo review." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 
745, 751 (Utah 1996). Because Appellant did not argue at the administrative level that, 
because Officer Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation, the 
exclusionary rule should apply to exclude evidence of his intoxication obtained after the 
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purportedly unconstitutional traffic stop, these issues were not preserved for judicial 
review. Thus, the trial court erroneously addressed them on judicial review and this 
Court should decline to consider them on appeal. Brown & Root, 947 P.2d at 677; 
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847; Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589-90. 
II. THE DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, RESPONDENT IN THE DISTRICT 
COURT TRIAL DE NOVO, WAS NOT REQUIRED TO "PRESERVE" ITS 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS AT THE INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
Beller contends the Division should have been barred from arguing the 
inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to driver's license 
proceedings. He argues that the Division waived this issue by not raising it before the 
hearing officer during the informal adjudicative hearing. Br. of Aplt. at 10. Appellee 
Rolfe urges the Court to reject this misuse of the waiver doctrine embodied in Badger, 
966 P.2d at 847, as it has no support in Utah law or in sound public policy. 
First, neither Badger nor any other precedent applies the waiver doctrine to bar a 
respondent agency from raising arguments in a district court action filed pursuant to 
section 63-46b-15(2) to review final agency action after informal adjudication. All the 
cases apply it against the petitioner in district court and bar issues and arguments the 
petitioner did not preserve by raising them first in the administrative proceeding. E.g., 
Badger, 966 P.2d at 845; Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589; Barney, 885 P.2d at 809. Indeed, 
the Utah Supreme Court contemplates that the waiver doctrine will only hobble those 
parties who petition for judicial review of agency action: "[A] party seeking review of 
agency action must raise an issue before that agency to preserve the issue for further 
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review." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (emphasis added). With regard to preservation of 
issues at informal agency adjudications, the Court adopted the "level of consciousness" 
test, "requiring a plaintiff [petitioner] to bring an issue to the fact finder's attention so that 
there is at least a possibility that it could be considered." Id.; see also S&G, Inc. v. 
Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) ("persons aggrieved by decisions of 
administrative agencies" may not bypass the agency hearing and seek judicial resolution 
of issues).5 
Second, Beller's argument is contrary to public policy choices already made by the 
Utah Legislature, which has created administrative agencies to resolve many disputes 
between the government and its citizens outside the judicial system. Informal 
proceedings are authorized for numerous types of administrative adjudications, including 
driver's license matters. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (West 2004). According to the 
Driver License Division's Annual Report for FY 2006, there were 14,138 arrests in Utah 
for driving under the influence. During the same year, the Division's hearing officers 
conducted 4,044 hearings related to driver's license suspensions or revocations after DUI 
arrests or convictions, hearings that are not attended by Division staff or counsel. 
If the waiver doctrine applies to the agency itself when it is respondent on judicial 
review, the Division will have to send an assistant attorney general to every alcohol-
applying the Badger waiver doctrine to petitioners in de novo actions, but not to 
respondents there, is consistent with the appellate courts' practice of affirming on any 
alternative ground supported by the record, even if never raised in the trial court by 
appellee. See State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, \ 5 n.2, 987 P.2d 1284, 1286. 
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related hearing to respond to a driver's legal arguments with its own and to defend the 
constitutionality of the traffic stop and any DUI arrest-as well as the validity of field 
sobriety tests and portable breathalyzer results-in order to prevail at any subsequent trial 
de novo in district court on judicial review.6 All other agencies (such as the Water 
Engineer and the Tax Commission) will be required to do the same at any informal 
adjudications they conduct in order to prevent their final agency actions from being 
automatically overturned on de novo judicial review. Neither the Utah Legislature nor 
the appellate courts have ever contemplated such a complication of the informal 
administrative adjudication process under UAPA. 
For these reasons, the Court should affirm Judge Medley's implicit decision not to 
apply the waiver doctrine against the Division, respondent in the district court proceeding, 
to bar its argument that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in driver 
license proceedings. 
III. BY FAILING TO RAISE IT IN THE TRIAL COURT, APPELLANT 
WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE APPLICABILITY OF A 
STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN DRIVER'S LICENSE PROCEEDINGS 
Judge Medley concluded that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not 
apply in in driver's license revocation proceedings, which are civil, not quasi-criminal, 
and of a remedial, not punitive, nature. R. 66-67. Beller does not argue otherwise on 
6Although the Division is respondent at these trials de novo, it nonetheless bears 
the burden of proof. Pledger v Cox, 626 R2d 415, 417 (Utah 1981). 
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appeal.7 Instead, he argues that a state exclusionary rule applies at the administrative 
hearing to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a traffic stop that is unsupported by 
reasonable suspicion and, thus, in viokition of either the Fourth Amendment or Utah 
Constitution, article I, § 14. Br. of Aplt. at 5, 11-19 (Argument IIB, captioned "THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE OF ARTICLE I, § 14 APPLIES."). 
As noted above, a lack of reasonable suspicion was not raised by Beller at the 
administrative hearing, nor did he claim any violation of the Utah Constitution. Likewise, 
no mention was made there of any state exclusionary rule. Thus, Beller could not have 
raised these matters in the trial court on de novo judicial review because they were 
waived. See Brown & Root, 947 P.2d at 677; Badger, 966 P.2d at 847; Pease, 694 P.2d 
at 616. 
7The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to extend the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule to civil proceedings. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. 
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (holding exclusionary rule is inapplicable to adult parole 
proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (declining to extend 
exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-
52 (1974) (declining to apply exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings); State ex rel. 
A.R., 1999 UT 43,1j 20, 982 P.2d 73, 78 (holding exclusionary rule does not apply in 
child protection proceedings); State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, \ 7, 987 P.2d 1284, 
1286 (holding exclusionary rule does not apply in adult probation revocation 
proceedings). The only exception is Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 
(1965), in which the exclusionary rule was held applicable in a nominally civil forfeiture 
proceeding that was found to be quasi-criminal in nature because of its punitive purpose. 
The Utah Supreme Court has already held that license revocation proceedings are 
intended to protect the public, not to punish, and that they are not quasi-criminal. Ballard 
v. State, 595 P.2d 1302, 1304-05 (Utah 1979); see generally Michelle L. Hornish, Note, 
Excluding the Exclusionary Rule, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 533, 542 (2000) (concluding that a 
majority of states does not apply the exclusionary rule in administrative license hearings). 
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Just as importantly, however, no argument was raised by Beller in the trial court 
concerning any alleged violation of article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, or of the 
applicability of a state exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained after an 
unconstitutional traffic stop. Neither topic was argued, analyzed, suppoited ot * vcn 
mentioned at trial, R. 79, or in his post-trial memoranda, included here as Addendum E. 
"Absent plain error or extraordinary circumstances, we do not address issues raised 
for the first time on appeal." Bd, of Trustees v. Keystone Conversions, LLC, 2004 UT 84, 
% 32 n.8, 103 P.3d 686, 694; accord State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1 I I U1 Kali 1994) 
(declining to address state due process claim not presented to trial court). No plain error 
or extraordinary circumstances have been claimed or demonstrated here. 
Because Beller failed to argue below that a state exclusionary rule rendered 
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the state or federal constitutions, he 
has waived the issue.8 
TV UTAH STATUTES GOVERNING DRIVER'S LICENSE REVOCATION FOR 
DUI DO NOT REQUIRE TRAFFIC STOPS OR REQUESTS FOR SOBRIETY 
TESTS TO SATISFY FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS 
Without identifying it as a separate issue, Beller suggests that the statutes 
governing revocation of the licenses of those who drive while impaired incorporate a 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard applicable to a traffic stop that ultimately 
reveals impaired driving, as well as the effectuating federal exclusionary rule. Br. of 
8This same issue has been argued by appellant in Pearce v. Rolfe, No. 20060539-
CA, in which the State's responsive brief is currently due January 18, 2007. 
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Aplt. at 15, 17, 19. According to Beller, the requirement in sections 41-6a-521(3) and 
53-3-223(6)(c) that a license revocation hearing address whether there were "reasonable 
grounds" to believe the driver was operating a vehicle while impaired is "fairly read as 
permitting inquiry into Fourth Amendment issues." Br. of Aplt. at 15. 
To buttress this argument, Beller claims that license revocation hearing officers 
"have historically and routinely permitted inquiry into the bases for traffic stops 
. . . and have refrained from revoking licenses in cases involving Fourth Amendment 
violations.. . ." Id. at 17. Beller also describes the alleged "standard practice of applying 
the exclusionary rule" in revocation proceedings, which he contends should be continued. 
Id. at 18. There is no support in the record for these self-serving claims. The record 
material repeatedly cited by Beller, R. 53-55, consists solely of the unsupported argument 
of Belter's counsel in his post-trial memorandum, which is not evidence. State ex rel 
Division of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104, ^ j 31 
n.10, 132 P.3d 687, 697 (concluding argument of counsel is not evidence). There is no 
evidence in the record of any such practices at the revocation hearings. 
In any event, in determining whether Utah statutes incorporate the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness requirement for traffic stops as well as administration of 
sobriety tests, this Court must "give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the 
plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n v. Stephenson, 2006 UT 84, f^ 32, P.3d . Other interpretive tools, 
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including the agency's implementation of a statute, are only appropriate if tin sudik 
itself is ambiguous. See id. No such ambiguity is present here. 
The legislature has clearly articulated the public safety purpose of Utah's Driver 
License Act: 
Purpose of revocation or suspension for driving under the influence. 
The Legislature finds that the purpose of this title relating to suspension or 
revocation of a person's license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle for 
driving with a blood alcohol content above a certain level or while under 
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination of alcohol and any 
drug, or for refusing to take a chemical test as provided in Section 41-6a-
520, is protecting persons on highways by quickly removing from the 
highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (West Supp. 2006); see also Ballard, 595 P.2d at ; 30:> ("The 
administrative [license] revocation proceedings are to protect the public, not to punish 
individual drivers."). Under sections 41-6a-521 and 53-3-223(6), a person whose license 
is being revoked for driving while impaired can request a hearing before the Division. 
"The hearing . . . shall cover the issues of: (i) whether a peace officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-
502 [prohibiting driving with more than set concentration of alcohol in one's blood or 
breath] or 41-6a-517 [prohibiting driving with any measurable amount of controlled 
substance in the body.]" Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(6)(c)(i) (West Supp. 2006). The 
language of section 41-6a-521(3)(a) is almost identical, only adding sections 41-6a-530 
(providing that alcohol restricted drivers may drive with no "measurable or detectable 
amount of alcohol" in their bodies), 53-3-231 (prohibiting persons under 21 from driving 
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with any measurable alcohol in their bodies), and 53-3-232 (prohibiting "no alcohol 
conditional" licensees from driving with any alcohol in their bodies). 
Under the plain language of the statutes, the revocation hearing must inquire into 
whether "a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving" while 
impaired by unlawful levels of alcohol or drugs. The statutes do not require any inquiry 
into the grounds for a traffic stop that ultimately discloses impaired driving, nor do they 
require anything more than "reasonable grounds" even for the officer's belief that the 
driver is impaired. No mention is made of the Fourth Amendment, the Constitution, the 
exclusionary rule, or the constitutional standards of "reasonable suspicion" or "probable 
cause." 
Reller's unsupported claim that the legislature really meant "Fourth Amendment 
probable cause" when it said "reasonable grounds" in these statutes, Br. of Aplt. at 15, is 
frivolous. Notwithstanding anomalous arrest statutes that have been modified by case law 
to require probable cause for an arrest,9 the legislature is fully capable of employing the 
discrete term "probable cause" to carry out its intent when it means to. A Westlaw search 
of this term yields 78 statutory usages in Utah. 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court long ago defined "reasonable grounds" for a 
police officer's belief that a person is driving while impaired under Utah's statutes: 
9Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-7-2, -3 (West 2004). 
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[T]he officer must h&ve a reasonable basis for his belief that the person 
requested to submit to a chemical test was driving or in actual physical 
control of the motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 
"Reasonable grounds" exist where the facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy 
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the situation exists. 
Ballard, 595 P.2d at 1306 (footnotes omitted). Notably, in providing this definition of the 
statutory term, the Court did not rely on the Fourth Amendment or federal case law 
interpreting it. 
Most states that have considered the question have refused to read into their civil 
license revocation statutes a requirement that the officer's traffic stop or request for 
sobriety tests pass constitutional muster. E.g., Nevers v. State Dep 7 of Admin., 123 P.3d 
958, 962-63 (Alaska 2005); Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel Arizona Highway Dep't, 54 P.3d 
355, 363 (Ariz. Div. App. 2002); Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 743 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Conn. 
1999); Powell v. Secy of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1305-06 (Me. 1992); Riche v. Director of 
Rev., 987 S.W.2d 331, 333-336 (Mo. 1999); Chase v. Neth, 697 N.W.2d 675, 684 (Neb. 
2005); Beavers v. State Dep 7 Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 851 P.2d 432, 438 (Nev. 
1993); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Wysocki, 535 A.2d 77, 79 (Pa. 1987). 
A few states have interpreted their own revocation statutes otherwise, usually 
based on the distinctive language of their statutes. See People v. Krueger, 567 N.E.2d 
717, 721 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1991); Olson v. Comm r of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 
553 (Minn. 1985); Watford v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 61A N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ohio 
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1996); Pooler v. Motor Vehicles D/v., 755 P.2d 701, 702-03 (Ore. 1988); State v. Lussier, 
757 A.2d 1017, 1018, 1020 (Vt. 2000) (premised on state constitution). 
No case law, however, adopts the radical statutory construction proffered by 
Beller, Br. of Aplt. at 15, which would equate "reasonable grounds" in sections 41-6a-521 
and 53-3-223(6) with Fourth Amendment probable cause before an officer could carry out 
a traffic stop or administer sobriety tests. This would impose a more stringent standard 
than the Fourth Amendment does,10 crippling traffic enforcement as well as drunk driving 
enforcement. There is simply no basis for concluding that the Utah Legislature intended 
this bizarre result when it provided that an officer must have "reasonable grounds" to 
believe a person is driving while impaired. 
The trial court thus correctly declined to read the term "reasonable grounds" in 
sections 41-6a-521 and 53-3-223(6) as incorporating a Fourth Amendment probable cause 
standard for the predicate traffic stop or for the suspicion of impaired driving. 
V. A RULING ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS 
IMPROPER IN LIGHT OF THE TRLVL COURT'S DETERMINATIVE, NON-
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCLUSION THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES 
NOT APPLY IN DRIVER'S LICENSE HEARINGS 
It is well-established that a constitutional question "is not to be reached if the 
merits of the case in hand may be fairly determined on other than constitutional issues." 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ^ 21, 48 P.3d 941, 947 (citation and quotation 
omitted); accord State ex rel A.R., 1999 UT 43, ^  13, 782 P.2d 73, 77; KD. v. A.B., 2003 
]See discussion at 14-15, supra, of the Fourth Amendment standards. 
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UT App 215,1} 10 n.3, 73 R3d 971, 973; State v. Rodriguez, 2002 UT App 119, % 4,46 
P.3d 767, 768; State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, % 30 n.8, 32 P.3d 976, 985; State v. 
Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, % 5, 987 P.2d 1284, 1286. 
State ex rel A.R. is particularly instructive since it involved a similar issue to the 
one presented here. In it, the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in child protection proceedings to exclude 
evidence obtained in a search by police that was allegedly conducted in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. The juvenile court had not addressed the constitutional 
reasonableness of the warrantless home entry in A.R. because of its determinative 
conclusion that, in any event, the exclusionary rule did not apply in child welfare 
proceedings. 1999 UT 43,11f 2, 12 n.6. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that legal conclusion about the 
exclusionary rule, but also determined that the warrantless search violated the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. ^9. On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court first addressed the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule to child protection proceedings, adding: "Only if the 
rule does apply in this context is it necessary to determine whether the warrantless 
searches constituted a Fourth Amendment violation." Id. % 13; accord Jarman, 1999 UT 
APP 269, % 5, 987 P.2d 1284, 1286 (citing State ex rel A.R. and noting court need not 
reach merits of constitutionality of a search of a probationer if the exclusionary rule is 
^applicable to adult probation revocation proceedings). The court in Jar man, 
concluding the exclusionary rule does not apply to adult probation revocation 
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proceedings, never addressed the constitutionality of the search. Likewise, in State ex rel 
A.R., the Utah Supreme Court never reached the constitutional issue: "Because we have 
held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in child protective proceedings, it is unnecessary 
to consider in this case whether the searches by police officers were unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment." 1999 UT 43, % 23. 
Here, as in State ex rel. A.R., inapplicability of the exclusionary rule is a non-
constitutional basis on which to reject Beller's efforts to exclude at the trial de novo 
evidence of his intoxication. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 
U.S. 357, 362-63 (1998) (exclusionary rule is prudentially-created means of deterring 
Fourth Amendment violations, not a constitutionally-mandated one); Jarman, 1999 UT 
App 269, ^ f 6 (same). The reasonable suspicion issue, on the other hand, does present a 
constitutional question. See, e.g., Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. 
Although the trial court concluded that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in 
driver's license hearings, it first addressed whether the traffic stop was unconstitutional 
for lack of reasonable suspicion. Addendum A, R. 64. The court's analysis is backwards. 
Whether the traffic stop comported with the Fourth Amendment was irrelevant once, as 
the trial court concluded, the evidence of Beller's driving under the influence was 
admissible regardless of whether Officer Kendrick had reasonable suspicion for the 
traffic stop. In light of the overwhelming precedent directing courts to avoid gratuitous 
determination of constitutional questions, the trial court erred in addressing the matter of 
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reasonable suspicion despite its determinative resolution of the case based on the 
exclusionary rule issue. 
For this reason, the Court should vacate that portion of the trial court's opinion 
concerning whether there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. 
VI. OFFICER KENDRICK ARTICULATED SPECIFIC, OBJECTIVE FACTS 
CONSTITUTING REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT BELLER'S MOTOR-
CYCLE MUFFLER VIOLATED A CITY EQUIPMENT REGULATION 
If the Court determines not to vacate the trial court's ruling on reasonable 
suspicion, it should nonetheless reverse Judge Medley's erroneous conclusion that it was 
lacking here. 
A police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle "when the officer has 'reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense.. . .' [A]s long as an 
officer suspects that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic 
and equipment regulations, the police officer may legally stop the vehicle." Lopez, 873 
P.2d at 1132 (quotations and citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion determinations 
turn on the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop. Id. at 1137 n.6. 
Here, Officer Kendrick articulated more than enough objective facts to constitute 
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop of Beller. Officer Kendrick was a veteran 
motorcycle cop on traffic control, with ten years of experience. He had two opportunities 
to assess the volume of Beller's motorcycle-once when it passed him on the other side of 
the street and once when it passed very close to the officers on the northbound side of the 
street. Officer Kendrick testified that Beller's motorcycle, which looked like his own 
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Harley Davidson Road King, was "extremely loud." It was so loud he could heard it a 
block away, which the officer opined is louder than a stock-equipped muffler on a Harley. 
The loud volume of Beller's exhaust could have, by itself, provided Officer Kendrick 
with reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 2002 
WL 1000298, 2002 UT App 163 (concluding that a "loud clicking noise" emanating from 
defendant's vehicle as it passed provided reasonable suspicion of violation of an 
equipment regulation, justifying the traffic stop) (Addendum F); see also South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (noting that police routinely stop vehicles if 
violations, such as "excessive noise," are noted); United States v. Vanness, 342 F.3d 
1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 2003) (officers who stopped a car emitting loud music objectively 
and reasonably relied on a local ordinance prohibiting "unreasonable noise"); United 
States, v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 70, 71 (10th Cir. 1972) (noting, without comment, that police 
stopped defendant's car for operating in violation of noise ordinance). 
But, in addition to what he heard, what Officer Kendrick saw on Beller's bike as 
he pulled up to the two motorcyclists at the stop sign on 400 West and 700 South 
supported his initial suspicion that the exhaust system had been modified. He saw an 
aftermarket modification, a "supertrap style" muffler on Beller's bike, and he knew of no 
motorcycle manufactured with such a device, which has adjustable discs that allow the 
volume of the exhaust to be modified. And he saw spark plugs mounted in the muffler 
itself, with wires going to the undercarriage, an unusual configuration also suggesting that 
the muffler system had been modified after manufacture. Both observations, coupled 
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with what the officer considered, in his experience, to be an usually loud exhaust noise 
for a motorcycle, provided him with reasonable suspicion that Beller was violating Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 12.28.100, which prohibits modification of the originally installed 
exhaust system to amplify its sound, as well as riding a vehicle so modified. 
Beller argued, and Judge Medley agreed, that Officer Kendrick could not form 
such a reasonable suspicion unless he had a decibel meter or knew the make or model of 
Keller's motorcycle, as well as the bike's factory specifications and the kind of muffler 
originally installed on it. R. 36, 38, 65; Br. of Aplt. at 6.11 There is, however, no legal 
support for these arguments, which would require an officer to know-and not just 
reasonably suspect-that a muffler modification has been made. Reasonable suspicion is 
assessed based on the totality of circumstances before the officer, who need not know for 
certain that there has, in fact, been an equipment regulation violation.12 
Officer Kendrick articulated specific, objective facts that gave him a reasonable 
suspicion of an equipment violation on Beller's motorcycle. Thus, the trial court's 
judgment upholding the Division's suspension of Appellant's license should be affirmed, 
albeit on the alternative ground that the traffic stop was not unconstitutional. See Jar man, 
uContrary to Beller's counsel's representation, R. 36, 38, accepted by Judge 
Medley, R. 65, the transcript shows Officer Kendrick did not testify that he believed 
Beller's bike was custom-made. 
l2What the officer learns after a valid traffic stop can, of course, dispel any 
reasonable suspicion, requiring the officer to cease detention of the driver. E.g., State v. 
Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ^ 17 & n.9, 107 P.3d 706, 711. 
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1999 UT App 269, ^ 5 n.2, 987 P.2d 1284, 1286 (appellate court can affirm on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee Rolfe asks the Court to affirm the Division's 
revocation of Better's license by: (a) vacating that portion of the trial court's judgment 
addressing the constitutional reasonableness of the traffic stop; (b) declining to address 
the issues of the officer's reasonable suspicion and applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule because of Appellant's failure to raise them in the 
administrative proceeding; (c) declining to address the state exclusionary rule issue 
because it was waived by Appellant's failure to raise it in the trial court; and (d) 
concluding that the Utah civil statutes governing revocation of licenses of impaired 
drivers do not incorporate a Fourth Amendment probable cause standard. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Although most of the issues raised by appellant have been waived and the 
remaining issue on appeal is not complex, the cross-appeal issues regarding reasonable 
suspicion are important enough to merit oral argument and a published opinion for the 
benefit of the bench and bar. 
Respectfully submitted this 12 day of January, 2007. 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL 
Utah Solicitor General 
Attorney for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT were mailed, with first-class postage prepaid, this 
h, day of January, 2007, to the following Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-
Appellee: 
Ronald Yengich 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ, 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS J. BELLER ; 
Petitioner, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VS. : CASE NO. 050913807 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State 
Driver License Division : 
Respondent. : 
Before the Court is petitioner's Petition seeking review of the 
suspension of his drivers license and driver privileges. Petitioner 
appeared and was represented by Ronald J. Yengich. Respondent appeared 
through Rebecca D. Waldron, Assistant Attorney General. The Court having 
heard and considered the evidence, stipulations of the parties and 
arguments, being fully advised in the premises, enters this Memorandum 
Decision. 
BACKGROUND 
In the early morning hours of July 1, 2005, petitioner and a 
companion passed by Officer Kendrick {"Kendrick") on separate motorcycles 
traveling on the opposite side from where Kendrick was stationed. 
Kendrick later stated that he thought that the motorcycles sounded 
unusually loud. When petitioner passed for the second time, this time 
on the near side of the street, Kendrick pulled petitioner over. 
Kendrick also noticed that the engine of the motorcycle was lighted. 
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Kendrick later testified that he believed that petitioner had 
violated two separate ordinances. First, he believed that petitioner was 
operating a vehicle in violation of either a Salt Lake City or State 
ordinance governing the type of lighting a vehicle may have; and second, 
because he believed that petitioner was operating his motorcycle in 
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.28.100, which prohibits 
modification of an exhaust system of a motor vehicle in such a manner as 
will amplify, increase, or change the character of the noise emitted by 
a motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the muffler originally 
installed on the vehicle. 
Upon approaching and questioning petitioner, Officer Kendrick 
observed that petitioner appeared intoxicated. The field sobriety tests 
and intoxilyzer results confirmed this observation. Petitioner was 
arrested for operating his motorcycle under the influence of alcohol. 
An administrative hearing to determine whether petitioner's license 
should be suspended followed on July 28, 2005. As a matter of routine, 
the hearing officer apparently inquired into whether the stop was legal, 
but ultimately decided to suspend petitioner's license based upon the 
evidence obtained at the scene and thereafter. 
Petitioner appealed the decision in the present action, asserting 
that the suspension was arbitrary, capricious and without due process of 
law. 
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It should be noted initially, both counsel stipulated to the facts 
and corresponding conclusions of law as described in respondent's 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, beginning after the 
initial stop of petitioner. The parties' stipulation is incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
ANALYSIS 
Legality of the Stop 
Petitioner maintains that Officer Kendrick violated petitioner's 
Fourth Amendment rights of the United States Constitution because the 
traffic stop was not justified at its inception, and Officer Kendrick 
lacked reasonable suspicion that petitioner was violating the law. State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), Provo Citv v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360 
(Utah App. 1992). 
In the instant case, the Court finds from a totality of the 
circumstances that Officer Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion that 
petitioner was violating the law. Officer Kendrick testified he stopped 
petitioners' motorcycle because the sound of the muffler was extremely 
loud and that the engine was illuminated by blue lights. Officer 
Kendrick's detention of petitioner would not have been justified by the 
lights which illuminated the engine, based upon his failure to articulate 
whether the lights could be seen from in front of the motorcycle or 
whether the lights were located on the side of the motorcycle, which 
would not constitute a violation of the law. Officer Kendrick's 
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testimony regarding the engine illumination is unclear and cannot alone 
support a reasonable suspicion that petitioner committed a traffic or 
equipment violation. 
Officer Kendrick further testified that petitioner's motorcycle 
muffler was extremely loud and was suspected to be modified. Officer 
Kendrick based his suspicion upon his experience with motorcycles, yet 
other than riding a Harley Davidson Road King, the record is noticeably 
lacking any specificity describing Officer Kendrick's experience, such 
as how many years he owned and operated motorcycles? How is Officer 
Kendrick familiar with the sound of original and modified motorcycles? 
Officer Kendrick testified that at the inception of the stop, he could 
not identify the make or model of petitioner's motorcycle, nor its 
factory specifications. Other than Officer Kendrick's experience, which 
was not detailed, he had no other objective means of determining the 
decibels of petitioner's motorcycle. Officer Kendrick could not with any 
degree of reliability form a reasonable suspicion that petitioner's 
muffler had been unlawfully modified. Finally, Officer Kendrick 
testified he believed petitioner's motorcycle was custom made, that he 
did not know the bike's specifications, nor what kind of muffler was 
originally installed, therefore, Officer Kendrick could not form a 
reasonable suspicion the petitioner violated Salt Lake City Code § 
12:28.100. 
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Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule 
The crux of petitioner's contention is that the initial stop was not 
based upon reasonable articulable suspicion, and was therefore illegal. 
Accordingly, the argument follows, the evidence was obtained following 
the stop pursuant to an unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of 
the 4th and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution. By 
operation of the exclusionary rule, the suspension of driving privileges 
which flowed from that stop must be reversed. The issue which this 
argument presents to the Court is whether the exclusionary rule applies 
to DLD hearings—which are civil in nature, but often result—as was the 
case here—in the deprivation of rights or privileges. In a sense, as 
further analyzed below, the question really is whether the DLD hearings 
are civil, or quasi-criminal in nature. As applied to driver license 
revocation or suspension hearings, this is a matter of first impression 
in this state, and the parties concede that nationally, authorities are 
split.1 
Despite the novelty of this precise issue, both of Utah's appellate 
courts have consistently held that the exclusionary rule does not apply 
in civil cases. See In re: A.R. and C.P., 1999 UT 43, 982 P.2d 73 
xWhile there is a split on this particular issue, at least one 
writer believes that there is a majority view: "a majority of states 
do not apply the exclusionary rule in administrative license 
hearings." See Michelle L. Hornish, Note, Excluding the Exclusionary 
Rule, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 533, 542 (2000). 
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(holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil child protection 
proceedings); State of Utah v. Jarman, 1999 UT App. 269, 987 P.2d 1284 
(probation revocation proceedings). 
However, it is equally clear that, at least under the protection of 
the Utah State Constitution, the exclusionary rule applies to quasi-
criminal proceedings. See, Simms v. Utah State Tax Comm'n 841 P.2d 6 
(Utah 1992) (reasoning that illegally obtained evidence should be 
excluded from a civil proceeding if the proceeding is in effect criminal 
or if the exclusion is necessary to deter future unconstitutional 
searches).2 
While petitioner contends that the revocation or suspension of his 
driver's licence was a criminal sanction, he fails to support this 
contention with relevant Utah case law. Instead, he turns to cases from 
other jurisdictions which hold that a legal search and seizure is a 
necessary predicate to introduction of challenged evidence in a driver's 
licence suspension proceeding. This ignores Utah's clear stance that 
"while we agree . . . that the right to drive is a 
valuable right or privilege and it cannot be taken 
away without procedural due process, we do not 
agree that revocation proceedings are therefore 
necessarily criminal or quasi-criminal in nature." 
2Simms was a 2-1-2 plurality opinion, however, the one justice 
concurring in the result agreed with the plurality's opinion that the 
tax penalty at issue in that case was in effect criminal. 
LER V. ROLFE PAGE 7 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
v. State, 595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979). See also. Holman v. 
Cox, 5 9 8 p- 2 d 1331 ("This Court has made clear that license revocation 
proceedings, as such, are civil in nature and that constitutional rights 
afforded defendants in a criminal proceeding do not extend to those 
proceedings") . 
These cases are equally clear that the administrative consequences 
which flow from driving under the influence of alcohol are remedial, and 
not punitive in nature: 
The purpose of this administrative procedure is not 
to punish the inebriated drivers; such persons are 
subject to separate criminal prosecution for the 
purpose of punishment- The administrative 
revocation proceedings are to protect the public, 
not to punish individual drivers. 
Ballard, at 1305. Indeed, as the legislature states in its purpose for 
enacting the restriction: 
The Legislature finds that the purpose of this 
title relating to suspension or revocation of a 
person's license or privilege to drive a motor 
vehicle for driving with a blood alcohol content 
above a certain level or while under the influence 
of alcohol . . . is protecting persons on highways 
by quickly removing from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (2006). 
Based upon the clear weight of authority, because the Courts of this 
state uniformly consider a drivers' license revocation proceeding to be 
a civil action and not a quasi-criminal action, the exclusionary rule 
does not apply. Therefore, based upon the parties' stipulation 
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referenced hereinbefore and respondent's consideration of the evidence 
obtained at the scene in reaching her decision to suspend petitioner's 
license was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, petitioner's 
claim is hereby dismissed and the previously ordered stay of suspension 
of petitioner's license is hereby lifted. This constitutes the final 
Order of the Court on the matters referenced herein. No further Order 
is required. ^ 
Dated this / day of June, 2006> 
E. MEDLEY 
CT COURT JUDGE 
/• /£i 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this / day of June, 
2006: 
Ronald J. Yengich 
Attorney for Petitioner 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rebecca Waldron 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 1, 2005 Officer Kendrick observed Petitioner operating a motorcycle at or 
near 831 South and 300 West in Salt Lake City. As the Petitioner drove by southbound on 300 
West, Officer Kendrick noted that the motorcycle had an extremely loud altered exhaust, and 
blue lights emitting from under the gas tank. When the Petitioner drove by Officer Kendrick a 
second time, this time northbound on 300 West, a few minutes later, Kendrick initiated a traffic 
stop at about 831 South on 300 West. 
2. Upon approaching the Petitioner, Officer Kendrick noted the odor of alcohol and 
observed that Petitioner had glassy, blood shot eyes and relaxed facial features. The Petitioner 
further admitted to having consumed alcohol that evening. 
3. Officer Kendrick requested that Petitioner perform field sobriety tests. Officer 
Kendrick instructed and demonstrated the field sobriety tests to Petitioner. On the Horizontal 
Gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, Officer Kendrick noticed that both of Petitioner's eyes laked 
smooth pursuit, had nystagmus at maximum deviation and the onset of nystagmus prior to 45 
degrees. During the Walk and Turn test Petitioner stepped out of the starting position during the 
instruction phase, started too soon, stopped walking, made an improper turn, raised his arms for 
balance, missed the heel to toe, and stepped off the line. During the One Leg Stand test, 
Petitioner swayed, raised his arms, and hopped on counts 17 and 27. The portable breath test 
was positive for alcohol. 
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4. Officer Kendrick came to the conclusion that Petitioner was under the influence of 
alcohol to the degree that he was unable to safely drive a motor vehicle, and arrested Petitioner 
for driving under the influence of alcohol based on Petitioner's driving pattern, odor of alcohol* 
repetitive speech, glassy blood shot eyes, relaxed facial features, admission to consuming alcohol 
and Petitioner's poor performance on the field sobriety tests. 
5. Officer Kendrick read Petitioner the chemical test admonitions off of the DUI report 
form, then requested that Petitioner take a breath test, which Petitioner agreed to do. 
6. Officer Kendrick checked Petitioner's mouth pursuant to the "Baker" rule at least 
fifteen minutes before the intoxilyzer test. He observed nothing in Petitioner's mouth. Petitioner 
was in Officer Kendrick's presence from the time he first observed "Baker" until Petitioner blew 
into the intoxilyzer. 
7. Officer Kendrick was certified to operate the Intoxilyzer 5000. He operated the 
machine according to the operational checklist. The time of the test was 1:55 a.m. The result 
was .097 breath alcohol. 
8. The machine was working properly and had a maintenance check on May 18, 2005 
and June 2,2005. 
9. Petitioner was handed a copy of the DUI Summons and Citation which gave him 
notice of the Driver License Division's intent to suspend his license for 90 days. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent has met its burden of proof and shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that: 
1. Officer Kendrick had reasonable grounds to believe Petitioner was driving a motor 
vehicle in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502 based on the following: Petitioner's 
driving pattern, odor of alcohol, repetitive speech, glassy blood shot eyes, relaxed facial features, 
admission to consuming alcohol and Petitioner's poor performance on the field sobriety tests. 
In addition, Petitioner admitted to drinking that evening. 
2. The Intoxilyzer was maintained and working properly. 
3. Petitioner had a Breath Alcohol Content (BAC) of over the legal limit of .08. 
4. Petitioner was served with notice of the Driver License Division's intent to suspend or 
revoke his license. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Petitioner's Petition is denied. 
2. The revocation of Petitioner's driving privilege for a period of ninety days effective 
July 31,2005 is affirmed. 
3. The September 13, 2005 stay of the suspension of his license is lifted as of the date of 
this order. 
Dated this day of , 2005 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, postage prepaid, on thifcy^ day of 
November, 2005, to the following: 
Ronald J. Yengich 
175 E. 400STE400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 ^tf^ 
ADDENDUM C 
ADDENDUM D 
41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or with 
specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation or 
actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 
liters of breath. 
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
41-6a-521. Revocation hearing for refusal — Appeal. 
(1) (a) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the 
person's license under Section 41-6a-520 is entitled to a hearing. 
(b) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar days after the day on 
which notice is provided. 
(c) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the Driver License 
Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(d) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver License Division under 
this Subsection (1), the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked 
beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (l)(d)(ii) applies; or 
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of 
arrest under Section 41-6a-517, 41-6a-520, 41-6a-530, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or 
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of arrest 
under Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that would constitute a 
violation of Section 41-6a-502. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), if a hearing is requested by the person, the 
hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in which the offense occurred, 
(b) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other county if the Driver License 
Division and the person both agree. 
(3) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(a) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating a 
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502, 41-6a-517, 41-6a-530, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; and 
(b) whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests under Section 41-6a-520. 
(4) (a) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(i) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers; and 
(ii) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(b) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation 
Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 78-46-28. 
(5) (a) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was requested to 
submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to 
appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division 
shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah beginning on the 
date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (5)(a)(ii) applies; or 
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of 
arrest under Section 41-6a-517, 41-6a-520, 41-6a-530, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or 
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of arrest 
under Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that would constitute a 
violation of Section 41-6a-502. 
(b) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee 
imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(c) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision following a 
proceeding allowed under Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper. 
(6) (a) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under this 
section may seek judicial review. 
(b) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
(c) Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
53-3-223. Chemical test for driving under the influence — Temporary license — Hearing 
and decision — Suspension and fee — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violating or has 
violated Section 41-6a-502, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath 
alcohol concentration and driving under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a 
drug and alcohol or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a 
controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6a-517, the peace officer 
may, in connection with arresting the person, request that the person submit to a chemical test or 
tests to be administered in compliance with the standards under Section 41-6a-520. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6a-502 includes any similar local ordinance adopted 
in compliance with Subsection 41-6a-510(l). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to a chemical test that 
a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517 shall, and the existence of a 
blood alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle 
may, result in suspension or revocation of the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a blood or breath alcohol 
content in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517, or if a peace officer makes a 
determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in violation of Section 
41-6a-502, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the division and within 24 hours of arrest, give 
notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(4) (a) When a peace officer gives notice on behalf of the division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of arrest; and 
(iii) supply to the driver, in a manner specified by the division, basic information regarding how 
to obtain a prompt hearing before the division. 
(b) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the division, 
also serve as the temporary license certificate. 
(5) As a matter of procedure, a peace officer shall send to the division within ten calendar days 
after the day on which notice is provided: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report in a manner specified by the division indicating the chemical test results, if 
any;and 
(d) any other basis for the peace officer's determination that the person has violated Section 41-
6a-502or41-6a-517. 
(6) (a) Upon request in a manner specified by the division, the division shall grant to the person 
an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be heard shall be 
made within ten calendar days of the day on which notice is provided under Subsection (5). 
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b)(ii), a hearing, if held, shall be before the division 
in the county in which the arrest occurred. 
(ii) The division may hold a hearing in some other county if the division and the person 
1. both agree. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a motor 
vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers; or 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in accordance 
with the rates established in Section 78-46-28. 
(e) The division may designate one or more employees to conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any designated employee is as valid as if made by 
the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor 
vehicle is suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the division as required in 
the notice, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor vehicle is 
suspended or not. 
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this Subsection (7), is for a 
period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the date of the arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years 
under this Subsection (7) is for a period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. 
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 53-3-205(13) for driving under the influence, a fee under Section 53-3-105 to cover 
administrative costs, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated. This 
fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division hearing or court decision that 
the suspension was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under this section may file a 
petition within 30 days after the suspension for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is 
governed by Section 53-3-224. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALTLAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS J. BELLER, 
Petitioner, 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah 
State Driver License Division, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION TO REINSTATE 
DRIVERS LICENSE 
Case No. 050913807 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Comes now the Petitioner, Curtis Beller, by and through his counsel of record, 
Ronald J. Yengich, who hereby submits this memorandum in support of his petition to reinstate 
his drivers license. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
On July 1, 2005, at approximately 12:50 a.m., Officer Kendrick (hereinafter Kendrick) 
was assisting a fellow officer on a traffic stop near 700 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
He first heard what he considered to be a loud muffler coming towards his position from the 
south. He then observed two motorcycles traveling together on the other side of the street. At 
that time he could not determine which motorcycle was making the loud sound. In addition, he 
could not identify the make or model of either vehicle. He did not pursue the motorcycles at that 
juncture. 
A few minutes later, Kendrick saw the motorcycles heading south along 300 West 
approaching his position. He was alerted because one of the motorcycles, importantly it was not 
the vehicle driven by Petitioner, passed close to Officer Martinez's police motorcycle. Kendrick 
stated that his main concern was with the manner in which the other vehicle was being driven. 
He did not initially begin his pursuit because of concern as to Petitioner's muffler. Nonetheless, 
at this time, he believed that the sound coming from Petitioner's bike was louder than that which 
he would expect from an unmodified muffler system. However, Kendrick could not identify the 
make or model of Petitioner's motorcycle and he believed that it looked like it was custom made. 
Kendrick conceded that he was not familiar with the factory specifications of all motorcycles. He 
also noted that the motorcycle's engine was illuminated by blue lights located on the side of the 
vehicle. 
Kendrick pursued both motorcycles. He did not observe any traffic violations or other 
notable driving pattern as he followed Petitioner. He caught up with them at an intersection 
where Petitioner and his companion were stopped at a stop sign. He told Petitioner's companion 
to pull over and get off his bike. He also told Petitioner to pull to the other side of the road. 
Kendrick proceeded to conduct field sobriety tests and Petitioner was arrested for DUI. His 
license was subsequently suspended for 90 days and he subsequently filed the instant appeal. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
L DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE 
VIOLATED WHERE OFFICER KENDRICK SEIZED HIM 
WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT AN OFFENSE HAD 
OCCURRED. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was created to protect 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "The United 
States Supreme Court held that 'stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute^] 
a seizure within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention is quite brief.'" State v. Matinson, 875 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah 
App. 1994)(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). In order for a traffic stop to 
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the police officer's action must be justified at its 
inception and the resulting detention must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
that justified the interference in the first place. Id. (citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 
(Utah 1994)). 
Specific situations in which police officers are justified in making stops of 
citizens in their vehicles include the following: 
(1) When the officer observes the driver commit a traffic violation; 
(2) When the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is 
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or 
driving without a license; and 
(3) When the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is 
engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs. 
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992). 
Regarding the first justification, the traffic violation must be committed in the officer's 
presence. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.1 Consequently, if the officer did not observe the underlying 
offense, then "the stop [is J not justified at its inception and the evidence derived from it must be 
suppressed." Id. at 1134. Regarding the second and third justifications, unlike the first, an 
officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when he has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
driver is committing a more serious traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol 
or driving without a license, or, that the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such 
as transporting drugs. Matinson, 875 P.2d at 586-87 (emphasis added). In these circumstances 
Utah courts have recognized that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify the stop. Id. ("A 
stop is also 'justified when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is 
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a 
license...[or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting 
drugs.'") (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132); State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 
1997) ("a police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle... when the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver committed or is about to commit a crime, such as 
transporting drugs."); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992) ("police 
officers are justified in making stops... when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion 
1
 The court in Lopez quoted the United States Supreme Court saying, "as long as an officer suspects that the 'driver 
is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer may legally 
stop the vehicle." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 citing Delegare v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). However, in 
Lopez, the court ultimately remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether the defendant did, in fact, 
make a left turn without signaling. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134. 
that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or 
driving without a license"). 
In the instant case, Kendrick violated Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights because the 
traffic stop was not justified at its inception. While Defendant recognizes that this determination 
is highly fact sensitive, given the totality of the circumstances, Kendrick lacked reasonable 
suspicion that Petitioner was violating the law. 
Kendrick stated that he believed that Petitioner committed two traffic violations: his 
motorcycle's engine was illuminated and he believed that the muffler was loud. In the instant 
case, where the engine was illuminated by lights located on the side of the bike, the lighting did 
not constitute a violation of law. Kendrick was mistaken as to the law's requirements in this 
regard. In reference to the alleged muffler violation, Kendrick lacked reasonable^uspicipn that it 
had been modified. Kendrick could not identify the make or model of the bike, he could not 
identify its factory specifications, and therefore, he could not determine whether it had been 
modified. Furthermore, the fact that Kendrick believed that Petitioner was riding a custom bike 
indicates that reasonable suspicion was lacking. A custom bike could be manufactured with 
almost any muffler configuration. Therefore, Kendrick could not determine whether Petitioner's 
muffler had been modified to any degree of reliability. 
A. The Illumination of Petitioner's Engine Was Not in Violation of Law 
Kendrick mistakenly believed that the illumination of Petitioner's engine violated Salt 
Lake City Ordinance §12.28.090. That section reads in pertinent part as follows: 
(A) No person shall drive, move, stop or park, nor shall the owner or person in 
possession cause or knowingly permit to be driven, moved, stopped or parked on 
any street or alley, any vehicle . . . 
(2) Which is not equipped with those serviceable lamps, reflectors, brakes, horn 
and other warning and signaling devices, windows, windshields, windshield 
wipers, mirrors, mufflers, fenders, tires, and other parts and equipment in the 
position, condition and adjustment meeting the requirements of the laws of the 
state as to such parts and equipment... 
(4) Which is of such size, weight or condition, or is loaded or equipped in such 
manner as is in violation of the laws of the state with respect to such vehicle 
(B) No person shall do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required by the 
laws of the state relating to tires, lamps, brakes, fenders, horns, sirens, whistles, 
bells and other parts and equipment.. . . 
Salt Lake City Code §12.28.090. Therefore, there is not any specific requirement announced in 
the foregoing section concerning the illumination of the engine. Rather, one must look to the 
State Code to determine whether engine illumination on the side of a vehicle constitutes a 
violation of law. Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-1604 governs lamps and vehicle illumination; however 
it does not address illumination of an engine. Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-1616 regulates the use of 
colored lights and reads in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) Except for an authorized emergency vehicle and a school bus, a person may 
not operate or move any vehicle or equipment on a highway with a lamp or device 
capable of displaying a red or blue light that is visible from directly in front of the 
center of the vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-1616. Kendrick stated that he believed it was a violation to 
illuminate the engine of Petitioner's motorcycle. However, it was clear that any 
illumination was on the side of the bike, and not on the front. Therefore, no violation 
occurred regarding the illumination of the engine on Petitioner's bike. 
£ 
B. Kendrick Lacked Reasonable Suspicion That Petitioner's Muffler Violated the Law 
Kendrick also stated that he believed that Petitioner committed a violation 
regarding the state of his muffler. Salt Lake City Code §12.28.100 regulates the use of 
mufflers on a vehicle and states that no person shall modify the exhaust system of a 
motor vehicle in a manner which will amplify, increase, or change the character of the 
noise emitted by a motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the muffler originally 
installed on the vehicle. Salt Lake City Code §12.28.100. In the instant case, where 
Kendrick could not identify the make or model of Petitioner's motorcycle and believed 
that it was custom made, he could not determine what kind of muffler was originally 
installed. Where Kendrick conceded that he did not know factory specifications for all 
bikes, he could not know the specifications of Petitioner's bike at the time the muffler 
was originally installed. Furthermore, Kendrick stated that he believed Petitioner was 
riding a custom bike. Where Kendrick believed that the bike was custom made, he could 
not know what kind of muffler was originally installed. It logical conclusion is that 
Kendrick could not know whether the muffler was modified, and, in the absence of such 
information, he lacked reasonable suspicion in this regard. As reasonable suspicion was 
lacking, Kendrick was not authorized to conduct a traffic stop. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion to support the traffic 
stop in this case. Consequently, the subsequent detention was constitutionally unreasonable and 
Petitioner asks that his driver's license be reinstated accordingly. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 day of February, 2006. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
By < ^ ^ ^ - ^ 
RtfNALD J. YENGICH 
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P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS J. BELLER 
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NANNETTE ROLFE, ; 
Director, Utah State Driver ) 
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) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
) SUPPORT OF REINSTATEMENT 
) OF DRIVER'S LICENSE 
) Case No. 050913807AA 
i JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Petitioner, CURTIS J. BELLER, by and through his attorney of record, RONALD 
J. YENGICH, hereby submits this response to Respondent's Opposition of Petition to 
Reinstate Driver's License. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO RAISE ANY ARGUMENT 
AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND THEREFORE 
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE SUCH AN ARGUMENT 
AT THIS JUNCTURE. 
It is well established that claims which have not been properly raised before the 
trial court at the appropriate time may be deemed waived. Gibson v. Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah, 707 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah 1985); Pease v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984). Rather, to be sufficiently 
addressed, a claim must be "submitted to the trial court [in such a manner that] the court 
is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue." Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 
945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Requiring issues to 
be raised at the appropriate time promotes judicial efficiency by alerting the judge to the 
issue and allowing the opportunity to address and correct the matter before accepting 
otherwise irrelevant evidence. See State v. Holgate, 10 F.3d 346, 349 (Utah 2000); see 
also Turtle Management v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). 
In the instant case, the sole basis for the challenge at issue was the disputed 
constitutionality of the initial traffic stop. This was made clear to the Respondent before 
any witness was sworn or any evidence admitted. Furthermore, hearing officers routinely 
evaluate the propriety of the traffic stop and take no action upon a finding that the stop 
was unconstitutional. In this regard, the waiver issue under consideration is analogous to 
claims raised for the first time on appeal. It is well accepted that a claim cannot be raised 
on appeal unless it was preserved in the trial court. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also Pease at 616. The illegal basis for the traffic stop was 
argued by Petitioner at the driver's license hearing and, as is the practice in such 
hearings, the officer, a representative and agent of Respondent, considered evidence 
going to the constitutionality of the stop. 
The argument that Respondent seeks to raise at this juncture was waived in two 
respects. First, where the Driver's License Division routinely considers the 
constitutionality of the traffic stop at the initial driver's license hearing, Respondent is 
precluded from asserting the subject argument at this time on de novo appeal. 
Furthermore, and in the alternative, Respondent should have argued that evidence 
concerning the propriety of the stop was irrelevant at the evidentiary hearing before this 
Court. The only issue at that hearing was the constitutionality of the stop. By failing to 
raise this argument at that time, Respondent is precluded from arguing that the 
constitutionality of a stop is irrelevant in relation to a driver's license suspension. 
IL IN DRIVER'S LICENSE HEARINGS, THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS APPLICABLE TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER A STOP WAS VALID, 
The exclusionary rule should be applied to driver's license revocation hearings for 
several reasons. First, driver's license hearings are significantly different from other civil 
hearings where the exclusionary rule has been deemed inapplicable. Second, while this is 
an issue of first impression in Utah, other states have applied the exclusionary rule to 
driver's license hearings. Finally, the exclusionary rule has historically been applied to 
driver's license hearings in Utah. 
A. The exclusionary rule is applicable because driver's license 
suspension hearings are unique from other civil hearings. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has not ruled directly on the exclusionary rule's 
application to revocation proceedings. Both cases discussed by Respondent are not 
directly on point and are easily distinguished. See State v. C.R., 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
(Utah 1999) (the exclusionary rule does not apply in child protection proceedings); see 
also Penn Bd. Of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (the exclusionary 
rule is inapplicable in parole proceedings). 
The purposes of these other types of hearings are to discuss a child's welfare or a 
prisoner's parole possibilities. Even if evidence from an illegal search or seizure were 
suppressed from the hearing, the court would still weigh other factors and the analysis 
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would not be complete Nonetheless, application ul ilk e\< hi HHI.II , iiil v\«. I I I nd 
the healing., I iuU ,usl cxrludc OIK ol nr.mv pieces of evidence that m** mah 
However, a driver's license revocation hearing is substantia* viniL.i , >M a 
driver's license hearing, upphr.ilmn ul I In • rM'lusinniii ,.' inlr .'ould end the hearing. A 
di iver's license revocation hearing anaivzes three issues a whethei the officer had 
reasonable grounds to suspect the defenda,-. \ us opcim* ' f 
1: < ••- • • * ed to submit to a chemical test and,, c) the test results.. 1 ltah 
Code Ann. $ M~3-223(6)(< * If the exclusionary rule is apphcu as mc ., ;..... 
stop • . i sc 1 * -. i , the second and third issue* are not analyzed 
because they occurred after the illegal stop. Thus, the hearing is over H UIL ./i^mal stop 
or searcii i ..: ..., -; \' !* t r M w->i- nary rule 
is significant!} different ... :L-.L. . , tvnse heanr.^s iKn- m those case.*- uted by 
Respondent 
II -tiu*r states hold the exclusionary rule should apply lo <lnv<i 1 » 
:^  <** ^cation hearings. 
Utah .|.pL..aiL f, . ... I ill III "Mi Iii'.iiiiiiin, n i i r \ iinnluMiion i" 
driver's license revocation hramif»,\ Consequently, it is h meal \o analyze and sm-
other states' treatment of similar ,si.i>.. •*. i 
ilHerminro ilial the exclusionary rule sh'»u^- *; iriver's license -evocation 
hearings. .V..-. • fussier HI V* ^ ._..„ ., 
\[h, . . -:iu leasonabie grounds to suspect a DI.il 
violation is uiinealh extended to the question of whether there was a reasonable basis 
for the stoj 
iw .-"•.! « .* Hafford v. Motor I Jucta, 674 N.E.2d 776 (8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga County 1996), (holding a constitutional stop is required in analyzing a license 
suspension); People v Krueger, 208 III App. 3d 897 (2d Dist. 1991), (the statute 
implicitly requires arrests triggering license suspension must be lawful); Pooler v. Motor 
Vehicles D/v., 755 P.2d 701 (Ore. 1988), (defendants can argue validity of the stop); 
Brownsberger v. Department of Transp Motor Vehicle Div., 460 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 
1990), (a license revocation proceeding can be reopened if the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds for a DUI stop) but see Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 
331, 334 (Mo. 1999); Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Maine 1992). 
The Vermont Supreme Court held that a "constitutional stop is a necessary 
predicate for a finding that an officer had 'reasonable grounds' to believe a person was 
driving while intoxicated". Lussier, 757 A 2d at 1023 (emphasis added). The Court 
analyzed the language and purpose of the statute to determine that the Vermont 
Legislature must have intended that a constitutionally stop was "a necessary predicate to 
finding reasonable grounds for suspicion of DWI because defendants are permitted to 
dispute reasonable grounds in the civil suspension proceeding". Id. at 1020. It is 
illogical that the Legislature would allow a statutorily created right such as breath sample 
consent to be argued but ignore the right to be protected from unconstitutional stops. Id 
at 23. 
Similarly to Vermont, Utah's driver's license revocation hearings consider: a) 
whether the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant was operating under 
the influence of alcohol, b) whether the person refused to submit to a chemical test and, 
c) the test results. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(6)(c) (emphasis added). Applying the 
same logic as the Vermont Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the Utah Legislature would 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to rule the 
Respondent's current claim is barred and cannot be considered because it was not 
properly raised at the either the initial driver's license hearing or the evidentiary hearing 
on de novo appeal. Furthermore, the exclusionary rule should be applied in the 
revocation hearing and the Petitioner's license re-instated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ d a y of March, 2006. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
By RONALD J. YENGICH 
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GREENWOOD. 
MEM.OR ANDUM DECISION < No! I'<M I Kin ml 
Publication) 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
*1 Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress FN1 evidence discovered by 
Trooper Eldredge following Defendant's consent to 
search his vehicle. 
FN1. We .. . - Hidings ui iact that 
underlie the U\J> court's suppression 
decision for clear error, and its legal 
conclusions based upon those findings for 
correctness. See State v. Kohl, 2000 I JT 
35 ,U9 ,999P .2d7 . 
Warrantless searches are per se unconstitutional 
v-1 '1 ' the Fourth Amendment unless conducted 
nit to a recognized exception to the warrant 
lequnenient One such exception includes searches 
c ondiic ted pursiian,t to c ons ent.. I I owe ve r, f 61 a 
consent search to be valid, consent must have been 
given voluntarily and not have been, "obtained by 
police exploitation of... prior illegality. 
State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, i 43, 37 P.3d 1073 
(citations omitted). Defendant challenges the trial 
court's rulings that his consent was voluntar\ and 
that it was not obtained through exploitation .; T 
prior illegality,. We affirm. 
We first address the i iro!untanne> 
Defendant's consent. 
FN2. We review "the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion that consent was voluntary or 
involuntary ... for correctness." Stare \ 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, «; 7. P P.3d 
1135. 
•iiseni nr-i \< •unitary it it i-> obtained as "the 
pioduct ol duress or coercion, express or implied." 
1 actors indicating a lack of duress or coercion, 
vhich should be assessed in the "totality of all the 
urrounding circumstances," include: "1) the 
absence of a claim of authority to search by the 
Tficers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by 
the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) 
cooperation by the ownei of the [property]; and 5) 
•ksenre of dei eption or trick on the pan of" die 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99 at || 47 (alteration m original) 
(citations omitted). Nothing in the record indicates 
that '1 rooper Eldredge resorted to a claim of 
>nty, an exhibition of force, or deception to 
vnuuin Defendant's consent. Moreover, Trooper 
Eldredge merely requested Defendant's consent, 
explaining several times that he was asking for a 
voluntary consent. Furthermore, Defendant signed a 
•aivei. after Trooper Eldredge read the waiver to 
ami he cooperated by opening the trunk of his 
le lor Trooper Eldredge. Thus, the trial court 
corrcctK concluded that Defendant's consent was 
• • " - M i r 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No CI to K >ng. I S. Govt Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 2 
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Next, we consider whether Trooper Eldredge 
obtained Defendant's voluntary consent by 
exploiting a prior illegality. "In reviewing the 
legality of a traffic stop, we consider two questions: 
[Wjhether the officer's action was justified at its 
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." State v. Hansen, 
2000 UT App 353, U 9, 17 P.3d 1135 (alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations omitted). 
Defendant first argues that the stop was not justified. 
An officer is justified in stopping a vehicle "when 
the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the driver is committing a traffic offense.... [A]s 
long as an officer suspects that the driver is 
violating any one of the multitude of applicable 
traffic and equipment regulations, the police officer 
may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (alteration in original) 
(quotations and citations omitted). Defendant 
challenges the trial court's ruling that the stop was 
justified at its inception, arguing that "no traffic 
violations, articulable or reasonable suspicion 
justifies the stop." However, Trooper Eldredge had 
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
Defendant was violating an equipment regulation, 
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-117, -155 (1998), 
because he heard a "loud clicking noise" emanating 
from Defendant's vehicle as it passed. This caused 
Trooper Eldredge to believe that Defendant's 
vehicle was "obviously not in proper mechanical 
order," as if "a wheel [was] about to come off or 
something." Thus, the trial court correctly 
concluded that the stop was justified. 
*2 Next, Defendant asserts that Trooper Eldredge 
impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop by " 
asking [him] numerous unrelated questions he had 
no [ ] business asking" after Trooper Eldredge " 
discovered there was no problem such that he would 
not let Defendant go with a warning." FN3 Thus, he 
argues that although he "eventually consented to the 
search, he did so in the course of an illegal seizure." 
FN3. Defendant fails to specify of which 
questions he complains. However, the 
record reflects that the only questions 
Trooper Eldredge asked Defendant after he 
"let Defendant go with a warning," were to 
inquire about what items Defendant was 
responsible for in the vehicle. 
However, we conclude that Defendant was not 
seized for Fourth Amendment purposes after 
Trooper Eldredge told Defendant that he was "free 
to go." FN4 Thus, there was no seizure when the 
questions Defendant complains of were asked and 
when Defendant consented to the search. 
FN4. The "determination of whether an 
encounter with law enforcement officers 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment ... is a legal conclusion that 
we review for correctness." Salt Lake Citv 
v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, U 8, 998 P.2d 
274. 
"Not every encounter between a police officer and a 
citizen is a seizure. A person is seized under the 
Fourth Amendment when, considering the totality 
of the circumstances, the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that the 
person was not free to decline the officer's requests 
or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about 
his or her business." 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353 at U 12 (quoting State 
v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994)). In 
the present case, Trooper Eldredge returned 
Defendant's license and other documents to him, " 
[h]anded him the written warning so that he would 
feel free and ... told him that he was free to go." 
Defendant testified that he then thanked Trooper 
Eldredge and asked him, "Is there some place down 
here I can get this checked?" Only after this point 
did Trooper Eldredge question Defendant about 
what he was responsible for in the vehicle and 
request consent to search it. 
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a 
seizure ... would be the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer, some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's request 
might be compelled." 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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V^iit its. iNot Reported in i1. W) 
State v. PatefielcL 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah 
Ct.App.1996) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)). 
Nothing in the record suggests that any of these or 
similar indicators were present to show that 
Defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. To the contrary, the totality of the 
circumstances indicate that Trooper Eldredge's " ' 
conduct would [not] have communicated to a 
reasonable person that the person was not free to 
decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate 
the encounter and go about his or her business.' " 
••"<m, 2000 UT App at 1] 12 (citation omitted), 
-idingly, the questions Defendant complains of 
were not asked during the course of a "seizure,1' as 
contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, and 
Defendant's " 'consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation of [a] prior illegality...1 " Id. at % 18 
(citation, omitted),,,, 
In summary, Defendant's consent was valid because 
it " 'was given voluntarily, and ... was not obtained 
by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality/ " Id. 
(citation omitted). 
*3 Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVTS, Judge and 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD Judn 
Utah App.,2002. 
State v. Mitchell 
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